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Prior authors have concluded that case-specific determinants, such as the number of
professionals involved in a given case or the lead attorney's hourly rate, are the principal
determinants of variance in professional fees and expenses in US corporate restructurings. The
implication has been that less proximate variables, such as the availability of credit, the cost of
capital or coincident economic conditions, are not relevant to predictive models. While we do
not question the relevance of case-specific factors we question the practicality of models that rely
exclusively on such factors in order to predict future fees and expenses.
Our hypothesis is that both case-specific and less proximate variables are relevant to the
determination of professional costs in bankruptcy, since we believe that variables belonging to
each of these categories can act as frictions to the refinancing process or otherwise inform the
court's determination as to the efficacy of refinancing, thereby impacting the complexity and
duration of the restructuring process.
Our results are less than conclusive, since our data is limited. However, the data that we have
gives us reason to believe that the addition of non-case predictors may improve the accuracy of
case-specific models; in some instances, these non-case-specific predictors even displace case-
specific predictors (via a screen for statistical significance). Our analysis indicates that this
improvement is more pronounced when the data is sorted for Section 364 financing.
Our goal is to complement the on-going analysis of professional fees and expenses so that it
might better account for the potential impact of non-case factors and thereby yield a more
accurate and practical predictive model.
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Introduction
Traders and analysts often project direct restructuring costs as a percentage of the
debtor's assets. As a rule of thumb they often assume a 2% to 3% coefficient. The model
employed with respect to professional costs is therefore imprecise; this is justified, it seems, by a
lack of research on the subject and/or the belief that professional costs are not large enough to
justify a more detailed accounting.
Prior authors, such as LoPucki and Doherty (2006), have shown that rules of thumb such
as "2-3% of assets" can be misleading. For example, as LoPucki and Doherty indicate, the
Loewen Group, Inc., which filed in June of 1999, reported more than $140 million in
professional fees and expenses, or approximately 3.4% of assets at filing; whereas Pacific Gas &
Electric, which filed in April of 2001, reported $418 million in fees and expenses, or 1.7% of
assets at filing. I In other words, professional costs can be large and their variance is in part a
function of elasticity relative to debtor assets such that a constant multiplier is inaccurate. 2
Recent studies of direct restructuring costs have focused on what we term "case-specific"
predictors: those factors that are proximate to the case in that they are either specific to the firm
(e.g. the magnitude of the firm's assets) or to the restructuring process (e.g. the number of first
day motions in the case). The question that we wish to explore is whether or not models based
solely on proximate factors tell the full story.
Prior authors have argued that direct costs are a function of "opportunity." In other
words, as LoPucki and Doherty put it, "professionals have the opportunity to do more work in
' Information taken from "10K Professional Fees" data, Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database
(http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu).
2 Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, The Determination ofProfessional Fees in Large Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases Revisited (unpublished manuscript, June 11, 2006). -
bigger cases, longer cases, and [in] cases involving more professional firms." 3 We agree with
this over-arching assessment and ask, as an extension, whether factors external to the case (e.g.
credit spreads) might add to the complexity of the restructuring process and thereby enhance the
opportunity for direct cost generation.
In doing so, we evaluate LoPucki and Doherty's argument, which we summarize as
follows: (1) three case-specific factors - debtor size, case duration and the number of
professional firms involved in the restructuring - are in every case statistically significant and
explain approximately 85% of the variance in professional costs;4 (2) by extension, factors other
than these can account for no more than 15% of the variance in professional costs; and (3) most
importantly, factors less proximate to the case itself (e.g. market variables or macroeconomic
indicators) cannot explain a significant degree of the variance in professional costs, either by
adding to the accuracy of a case-specific model or by displacing these more proximate variables
(via a screen for significance).
We next outline our results, and then proceed with discussion and analysis. We employ
two methods of analysis: a cross-validation analysis using a 74-case data set taken from Lynn
LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD), and a forecast analysis which utilizes both the
LoPucki data (as training data) and data provided by the 2007 ABI fee study (as validation data).
The second (forecast) analysis is meant as both a check on the cross-validation results as well as
a supplement: the 2007 ABI fee study comprises cases filed later in time (2004, as opposed to
the period 1998 to 2003 used by LoPucki and Doherty); and, as we will explain, the ABI fee
study data allows us to sort for Section 364 ("DIP") financing.
3 Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, The Determination ofProfessional Fees in Large Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases Revisited (unpublished manuscript, June 11, 2006).
4 Id. at 42.
Results
1: Cross-Validation Method - LoPucki's BRD as Training and Validation Data Sets
Summary of Method
We perform a five-fold cross-validation using LoPucki and Doherty's data set of 74
cases, in order to ensure that each of these cases has a turn as both training and validation data.5
In each of the five runs our purpose is to compare the fit and predictive accuracy of a
"baseline" model, comprising only case-specific predictors, with the fit and predictive accuracy
of a model that comprises both case-specific factors and factors external to the case (e.g. market
interest rates). We term the second, more inclusive model the "modified" model for each run.
We avoid informing our construction of the modified model, in each run, by our
understanding of the overall data set. That is, the modified model in each run is based on an
OLS regression of case-specific and non-case factors against the 59 randomly-selected training
cases. However, we note that the set of case-specific predictors that we adapt from the LoPucki
and Doherty study, as well as the baseline models that comprise these in each run, is informed
by the entire 74-case data set.6
We also note that, as our goal is to explore whether or not a practical,forward-looking
model might benefit from the inclusion of factors external to the case, we convert LoPucki and
Doherty's "roles" variable into a ">3 professionals" dummy variable, since we cannot know
5 Id. at 6. Subsets I through 4 are trained on subset 5, 2 through 5 are trained on 1, etc.
6 We have attempted to mitigate this influence on the baseline models by (1) deriving OLS coefficients for each
case-specific factor for each of the ten runs and (2) by filtering for significance. However, productive discussion
and limited data require that we use factors similar to those of LoPucki and Doherty (after filtering for factors that
can be known or estimated pre-filing).
before-hand exactly how many professionals will be employed in a given case.7 Likewise, we
cannot know the duration of a given case or, by extension, the annual trend variable that LoPucki
and Doherty derive from the confirmation date for each given case; we therefore eliminate these
variables as case-specific predictors.
In each run, then, the baseline model comprises one or more of the following case-
specific variables, each of which is selected by step-wise (backwards) regression with a p-value
cut-off of 0.10: debtor size,8 number of professional firms employed, and case location.9
In each run, the modified model comprises both case-specific variables and one or more
of the following set of less proximate variables, which are again filtered at the 0.10 level.' 0
Security/ Rate
CS Levered Loan Total Return Index
CRY Index (6-month lag)
Crude Oil
Ln 5-year Swap Rate
Mortgage Delinquencies (% total, 6-month lag)
5y BB/ BB- Rate (6-month lag)
5y BB/ BB- Spread
LBO Deal Volumes (3-month trailing) *
DJIA Index
Fed Funds Target Rate (6-month lag)
Macro Indicator
Real GDP (6-month lag)
Investment/ Inventories
Ln ISM Index (6-month lag)
Corporate Profits (6-month lag)
Business Cycle/ Recession Indicator *
* Interaction variable.
7 It is more reasonable to assume that an educated guess can be made at this level, especially with larger cases. A
threshold of three was also used by Stephen Lubben in the more recent ABI fee study. Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter
1] Professional Fee Study, American Bankruptcy Institute (2007).
8 We modify LoPucki and Doherty's "assets" variable to include both assets and debt reported at filing, since, as
Lubben mentions in the ABI fee study, this is one way to avoid skewing based on significant asset write-downs. As
with other variables that appear to exhibit patterns when mapped against residuals for the estimate, we transform this
combined variable by taking its natural log.
9 Case location comprises two binary variables, for each of "DE" or "NY."
10 See Supplemental 3 for a brief description of each market-related/ macro variable.
Results of Cross-Validation Analysis
The results of this first analysis are given in Supplemental 2 below. In summary, we
observe significant variance in the improvement of the modified model over the baseline model
across the five runs, when we compare mean absolute errors (MAE) for each of these models
(where the error term is the difference between predicted professional fees and expenses and
actual fees and expenses). In three of the five runs the modified model does at least as well as
the baseline model, with a maximum observed MAE improvement of 62%. However, in two of
the runs, numbers one and five, the MAE improvement is, respectively, -95% and -92%. Further
analysis is required to better understand both the direction and magnitude of these MAE
deviations.
Across the five runs we observe the following in terms of improved fit relative to the
training data set.
Baseline Model Modified Model % Improvement
Run Adj R-sq SE Adj R-sq SE Adj R-sq SE
1 0.636 0.765 0.69 0.705 8.49% 7.84%
2 0.616 0.731 0.682 0.665 10.71% 9.03%
3 0.591 0.82 0.683 0.723 15.57% 11.83%
4 0.62 0.798 0.687 0.724 10.81% 9.27%
5 0.623 0.722 0.686 0.658 10.11% 8.86%
As indicated by the table, an improvement in fit (adjusted R-square) is observed in each
of the five runs. The average improvement in R-square is 11.14%, while the average
improvement in standard error is 9.37%. The results are fairly consistent across the five runs,
with the range in adjusted R-square being 0.591 to 0.636 for the baseline models and 0.658 to
0.724 for the modified models.
In terms of predictors that proved statistically significant for each run, this is again
outlined in Supplemental 2 below.
The debtor size variable (log of assets plus debt at filing) is significant in each of the ten
runs. On the other hand, the case-specific dummy variable for ">3 professionals," is significant
in four of the five baseline models - in run five this variable is displaced by the addition of non-
case-specific variables. Also of note is the lack of significance, in any of the runs, of the dummy
variables for case location."I
In total, nine of the market-related or macro variables show up as statistically significant
at the 0.10 level, and four of these variables - Fed Funds Target Rate, 5-year Swap Rate, CS
Levered Loan Returns Index and LBO Deal Values - each appear in more than one run.
2: Forecast Method - LoPucki's BRD Sample as Training Data and ABI Sample as
Validation Data
Summary of Method
In order to further explore the potential impact of less proximate predictors on
professional fees and expenses, we construct a second (forecast) analysis. The predictors
considered are similar in this analysis, but here LoPucki and Doherty's entire 74-case data set
(the "BRD Sample") comprises our training data while a randomly selected set of 101 cases
taken from Stephen Lubben's 2007 ABI Fee Study (the "ABI Sample") comprise the validation
data set.' 2
" LoPucki and Doherty note a lack of significance (at the 10% level) for each of these variables, except where an
annual trend variable is added. Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, The Determination ofProfessional Fees
in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases Revisited (unpublished manuscript, June 11, 2006).
1 Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study, American Bankruptcy Institute (2007). Stephen Lubben
is the Daniel J. Moore professor of law at Seton Hall University School of Law. See Supplemental 4 for a
description of the ABI Sample. There is no overlap between the training and validation data sets, since LoPucki and
Doherty's data set is limited to cases filed over the period 1998 to 2003, while Lubben's study is specific to cases
filed in 2004.
This provides us with both a second look at the potential impact of non-case predictors
and, importantly, a check against the possible impact of having informed the set of case-specific
predictors in the first (cross-validation) analysis with LoPucki and Doherty's analysis (which had
utilized all 74 cases in the data set).
Table 3 below outlines the baseline and modified models used in this second analysis. As
with the cross-validation analysis, we construct the baseline and modified models via a stepwise
regression with a 0.10 cut-off value. 13 Note that, as one might expect, the case-specific and
modified predictors below are similar to those observed in the first forecast analysis.14
Table 3: Baseline and Modified Forecast Models
Baseline Model Modified Model
Factor I Constant 1.3750 Constant 9.1871
Factor 2 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.7064 Sq-Log (Assets + Debts) 0.0134
Factor 3 SDNY Case -0.1874 CS Lev Loan Returns 0.2407
Factor 4 DE Case -0.1494 Fed Funds Target Rate -0.1513
Factor 5 3+ Professionals 0.1478
Results of Forecast Analysis - General
Table 4 provides the overall result from this analysis, by comparing the mean absolute
error resulting from the use of the modified model with that of the baseline model.
Table 4: MAE Forecast Results Using "Random Sample" ABI Fee Data Set
Mean Absolute Error
Baseline Foret Modified % Improvement
437,340 319,905 28%
" The dummy variable for "3+ professionals" is eliminated from the modified model based on a 95% confidence
interval that spans the zero value.
14 Some changes were made to case-specific predictors in order to sync with the data formatting or transformations
used by the ABI fee study. Most notably, the dummy variable for ">3 professionals" is converted to "3+
professionals." As a result we emphasize that the second forecast analysis is not meant to augment the first - the
two are not directly comparable - but is instead meant to further inform our discussion.
As indicated by Table 4, the modified model provides a 28% overall reduction in MAE
when both models are applied to the validation data set. In other words, with respect to the
validation data set (the ABI Sample), the modified model, which replaces all but one of the case-
specific variables (debtor size) with less proximate variables, is 28% more accurate.
Results of Forecast Analysis - After Sorting for Section 364 Financing
We ask whether or not the need to refinance in bankruptcy facilitates a more protracted
and complex restructuring process, thereby facilitating increased fees and expenses.
In order to better address this question we therefore sort the validation data set for
Section 364 financing and rerun the forecast analysis. 15 Table 5 below delineates these results.
Table 5: MAE Forecast Results Using "Random Sample" ABI Fee Data Set
Mean Absolute Error
Baseline Forecast Modified % Improvement
s. 364 - No 296,063 231,238 22%
s. 364 - Neutral 437,340 319,905 28%
s. 364 - Yes 890,601 579,131 35%
As indicated by Table 5, the mean absolute error measurement shows an improvement of
the modified model's accuracy over that of the baseline model, regardless of whether or not
Section 364 financing is utilized. However, the improvement is more pronounced in cases where
Section 364 financing is used (a 35% MAE improvement is observed as opposed to a 22%
improvement where such financing is not used).
15 Section 364 of the Code authorizes both ordinary course and new project financing for the debtor (commonly
referred to as debtor in possession financing, or "DIP financing.") This includes liens on unencumbered property,
junior liens on encumbered property, and priming liens. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) and (d). We filter the ABI Sample data
sets for a binary "DIP financing" indicator.
Discussion & Analysis
LoPucki & Doherty - General
Ultimately LoPucki and Doherty show a fit (adjusted R-square) of 0.849 after mapping
case-specific variables, such as case duration, against court-awarded professional costs.16 From
this they conclude that case-specific determinants "explain 85% of the case-to-case variance.""17
As they put it:
Three variables - asset size, case duration, and the number of
professional firms working - account for 85% of the case-to-case
variance in professional fees and expenses in large, public company
bankruptcy cases. That means that factors independent of these can
explain no more than the remaining 1500.
Readers might be inclined to view these principal determinants
as rough measures of the quantity of work necessary to reorganize or
liquidate a company. Professionals must do more work in bigger cases,
longer cases, and cases requiring more professional firms. But it seems
implausible to us that rough measures of true determinants would
account for such a large portion of the variance. We think it more likely
that the three variables we have identified are not surrogatesfor the true
determinants of the fee and expense levels observed, but the true
determinants themselves.'8 (Emphasis added.)
However, we question the completeness of this argument. The authors limit their
predictor set to variables that are closely tied to professional costs. For example, they examine
case duration as a predictor of professional costs (within the context of professional firms that
typically charge by the hour). While we do not question the accuracy of this analysis, it seems
analogous to observing a close correlation between the speed of a car and the driver's use of the
16 Id. at 9. The authors observe approximately at 59% increase in professional fees and expenses as reported in SEC
filings.
* Id. at 3.
1 Id. at 42.
brake pedal: we ask whether a myriad of issues, some of them perhaps less proximate to the
mechanics of the car itself, might prompt the application of the driver's foot to the pedal.
In addition, we note that LoPucki and Doherty examine a 74-case data sample and use all
of these cases to construct their regression. As such they are limited to information that is
apparent via overall fit; so that the presence of a few cases, which may or may not be
representative, may unduly impact their overall result.'9 This concern is perhaps underlined by
the apparent lack of normality in the LoPucki and Doherty data (see Supplemental 1).
In contrast our own hypothesis asks, for example, whether case duration (and by
extension professional costs) might depend on factors outside of the case itself and evaluates this
hypothesis by cross-validating each of the 74 cases.
We can see from Supplemental 2 below that, using LoPucki and Doherty's data set, there
is never a case where fitted accuracy, using case-specific factors that can reasonably be known
pre-petition, exceeds 64%.20 And, as we have observed, the addition of statistically significant
non-case-specific predictors adds on average more than 11% to fitted accuracy.
In each of the five runs the beta for the debtor size variable is decreased by the addition
of non-case variables. In three of the five runs the beta for the number-of-professional-firms
variable is also decreased; and in one of the runs, run four, this variable is displaced entirely by
the addition of statistically significant non-case-specific predictors.
19 This is perhaps apparent in the lack of significance for either of the two case location variables (see Table 2
above), although it is also possible that the addition of the "trend" or "roles" variables impacts the significance of
the location variables.
20 While the addition of the authors' "roles" and case duration variables would no doubt increase this statistic, the
result would be unrealistic from an ex ante modeling perspective.
These observations seem to call into question the completeness of LoPucki and Doherty's
argument, as outlined above.
In terms of non-case-specific predictors, the signs for those predictors that appeared more
than once were consistent. For example, the coefficient was negative in each instance where the
Fed Funds Target Rate appeared as statistically significant.
While further analysis is required to account for the betas and standard errors of each
non-case predictor, it appears that in general rates-oriented predictors - the 5y BB/ BB- spread,
the Fed Funds Target Rate (lagged) and the 5y Swap Rate - are negatively correlated with
professional fees and expenses. Intuitively, such rates are driven, at least in large part, by
expectations of future economic growth (or a derivative of these expectations). Since the
approval of debtor financing in a given case is often determined by the expectation that future
cash flows will support debt repayment obligations, it is plausible that the expectation of future
economic growth and a decreased tendency toward the lowering of key interest rates would
correlate with a less complicated, less protracted refinancing process. This would in turn
facilitate plan confirmations, thereby decreasing the accumulation of professional costs.
At the same time we observe from Supplemental 2 that macroeconomic indicators -
Corporate Profits, Investments/ Inventories and Real GDP - each exhibit a positive correlation
with professional fees and expenses. While this may imply a contradiction of the previous
hypothesis regarding correlations with rates variables, we believe that there is a consistent
21
explanation in that key interest rates often anticipate economic conditions.
2 We also lag several of our interest rate predictors by six months.
With respect to economic indicators, we postulate that at one end of the spectrum -
where economic growth occurs - professional fees and expenses would rise together with
general consumption. For example, as corporate profits improve law firms and other
professional firms can more easily get away with increasing their fees (we explore this idea more
empirically in the next section). We would expect that a general increase in professional fees
and expenses would have a kind of ripple effect on professionals operating within the distressed/
high-yield arena. But, at the other end of the spectrum - where, for instance, economic recession
occurs - we would expect that the demand for a limited number of high-caliber restructuring
professionals would increase, thereby driving up fees and expenses for these professionals.
We therefore postulate - although we do not yet have the data to prove it - that the curve
depicting professional fees and expenses is s-shaped with respect to economic indicators.
Further analysis is required to validate these hypotheses.
LoPucki & Doherty - Trend Variable
We have mentioned LoPucki and Doherty's use of an annual "trend" predictor. We
briefly examine this predictor below, since we believe that it illustrates our broader point: that
perceived case-specific predictors may in fact be driven by variables less proximate to the case.
The authors observe a 7% annual increase in professional costs and find an annual trend
22
predictor to be significant at the 0.10 level.
22id at 9. The authors cite an annual trend coefficient of 0.076 with a standard error of 0.039.
To illustrate this trend factor we reproduce below a monthly version of trend using the
23
same BRD Sample set of 74 cases. We can confirm that over time there appears to be a
gradual increase in professional costs.
Figures 1 & 2: Replication of LoPucki and Doherty's Trend Variable (2006 study)
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The implication is that accountants, attorneys, etc. can to some degree ratchet up their
fees annually - independent of other case-specific determinants - and, more importantly, that
their ability to ratchet up their fees is not tied to less proximate factors such as general economic
growth.
On the one hand we understand LoPucki and Doherty's intuition: as illustrated by
Figure 3 below, market rates exhibited inconsistent growth over the period 1998 to 2003 (the
period covered by BRD Sample data), while professional costs appeared to trend steadily
upward.
23 We use monthly increments in order to be consistent with other, non-case time series data used. We use a
baseline date of February 20, 1998 and in each case compare this with "Plan Date" (the earlier of plan confirmation
date and plan effective date). All data is provided by Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database.
Figure 3: Various Market Rates (1998 - 2003)
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However, we again suspect that this argument is incomplete, since market prices are the
result of supply and demand dynamics (which are in turn generally driven by broader factors
such as consumption, corporate profits, the costs of capital, etc). In other words, it seems
counter-intuitive that attorneys and accountants are able to periodically increase their rates by a
given rate, wholly independent of changes in economic growth or other factors.
We therefore apply a lagged GDP variable in order to examine its relationship with
professional costs.24 We plot the log of real GDP levels (lagged by six months against
confirmation date), on a per case basis, against the log of professional fees and expenses, as
shown in Figure 4 below. We also plot the monthly trend variable against real GDP (lagged by
six months), which is shown in Figure 5 below.
24 The predictor variable is Log (Real GDP - lagged six months).
Figures 4 & 5: Prof F&E v Real GDP (Lagged); Monthly Trend v Real GDP (Lagged)
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Figure 4 indicates that changes in Real GDP account for as much as 27% of the variation
25
observed in professional costs over the stated data set. And Figure 5 indicates that a large
percentage of the variance in the monthly trend predictor (roughly 97%) is explained by variance
in Real GDP.
While this factor alone is not dispositive - it is one among five statistically significant
predictors identified by LoPucki and Doherty - we are not surprised to find that market-related,
macro variables help to explain variations in professional costs. Indeed, it stands to reason that
broad-based economic growth would generally pave the way for higher professional fees, and
that the fees charged by restructuring professionals would not be immune to ripple effects.
Finally we observe that the exponential relationship between months elapsed and
professional costs (Figure 1) is itself suggestive. LoPucki and Doherty, as well as other authors,
transform their predictors in order to maximize a linear fit. It is natural to consider, by extension,
that professional costs might exhibit a higher-order relationship with certain non-case predictors,
or that a combination of non-case predictors could underlie changes in professional costs.
25 The correlation coefficient between the time series is approximately 0.98. Our GDP data is reported quarterly and
may not sync perfectly with the Plan Date for a given case.
Conclusion
Professional fees and expenses can impact creditor recoveries. The ability to predict
these costs is therefore advantageous to creditors, in particular unsecured creditors.
Observed variance in professional costs, including variance in predictors such as debtor
assets, means that rules of thumb based on debtor assets or other broad measures are insufficient
for this purpose.
The addition of non-case variables (i.e. market-related or macro) to our predictor set
appears to have a statistically significant, positive impact on the accuracy of the prediction of
professional fees and expenses.
While we cannot be certain of the magnitude of this impact, given our limited data, we
observe statistically significant improvement through both cross-validation and forecast analysis.
With cross-validation, for instance, we observe a greater fit accuracy through the addition of
non-case predictors in each of five runs; and predictive accuracy with respect to validation is
observed to improve by as much as 62%.
We also observe a strong connection between LoPucki and Doherty's case-specific
"trend" variable and changes in Real GDP.
We do not conclude from these results that prior authors are fundamentally mistaken in
their analysis. However, we believe that their current models are incomplete.
Our goal is to complement the on-going analysis of professional fees and expenses so that
it might better account for the potential impact of non-case factors and thereby yield a more
accurate, forward-looking predictive model.
Supplemental 1: BRD Sample - Data Description
Sample Description
LoPucki and Doherty sampled 74 large, public bankruptcies whose plans were confirmed
over the period 1998 to 2003.26 They describe their sampling method as follows.
We selected cases in three phases. In the initial data collection phase in 2001, we
collected data on all cases for which complete fee and expense data were available on
PACER.. .In the second phase of data collection in 2002, we added only cases from
Delaware and other courts. In the third phase in 2004 we added 26 cases. The new cases
came disproportionately from New York and other courts. To assure that our findings
would be applicable to large as well as small cases, we selected 20 cases with assets in
excess of $1 billion for which data were available on PACER...The mix of courts in the
resulting sample reasonably reflects the mix of courts in the population of large, public
27
company bankruptcies.
Reflecting the difficulty of obtaining professional fee and expense data, LoPucki and
Doherty's data set is not random. This is evident in part from the Q-Q plot below, which maps
standardized fees and expense data for the 74-case BRD Sample data. The plot indicates that
cases at the high and low ends of the range, especially, are respectively larger and smaller than
what we would expect to observe.
26 Id. at 3.
2 1 d. at 6-7.
1.5 2.5 3.5
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We provide below a summary of the BRD Sample, with a focus on those predictors that
are used in our analysis.
Fees & Expenses Assets
22,228,336
30,855,394
10,398,755
20,626,144
503,749
174,100,390
4,145,509
28,352,620
2,868,654,446
7,021,693,299
773,767,000
3,352,775,981
42,705,000
52,285,600,000
264,997,500
2,060,000,000
Assets + Debt >3 Roles
3,401,343,635
7,048,194,921
1,153,900,000
3,675,415,519
42,705,000
52,285,600,000
553,782,000
2,857,250,000
0.9054
0.2947
1.0000
0.1713
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
Supplemental 2: Five-fold Cross-Validation Models
Run 1: Baseline and Modified Models: -95% Improvement
Baseline Model Modified Model
Factor I Constant 1.046 Constant -3.274
Factor 2 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.676 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.604
Factor 3 >3 Professionals 1.048 >3 Professionals 1.016
Factor 4 SDNY Case P > 0.10 Corp Profits (6m Lag) 0.007
Factor 5 DE Case P > 0.10 5y BB/ BB- (6m Lag) 0.270
Factor 6 FF Target Rate (6m Lag) -0.318
Adj. R-sq: 0.636 SE: 0.765 Adj. R-sq: 0.690 SE: 0.705
Run 2: Baseline and Modified Models: 62% Improvement
Baseline Model Modified Model
Factor I Constant 2.563 Constant -0.520
Factor 2 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.617 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.586
Factor 3 >3 Professionals 0.860 >3 Professionals 0.685
Factor 4 SDNY Case P > 0.10 Ln 5y Swap Rate -0.964
Factor 5 DE Case P > 0.10 5y BB/ BB- Spread -0.188
Factor 6 Investments/ Inventories 0.004
Adj. R-sq: 0.616 SE: 0.731 Adj. R-sq: 0.682 SE: 0.665
Run 3: Baseline and Modified Models: 0.001% Improvement
Mean
Std. Dev.
Median
Mean Abs. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Ist Quartile
3rd Quartile
0.2973
0.4602
0.0000
0.4178
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.2703
0.4471
0.0000
0.3944
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
Baseline Model Modified Model
Factor I Constant 1.109 Constant 2.838
Factor 2 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.682 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.655
Factor 3 >3 Professionals 0.819 >3 Professionals 0.987
Factor 4 SDNY Case P > 0.10 CS Lev Loan Total Return Index 0.279
Factor 5 DE Case P > 0.10 Ln 5y Swap Rate -0.705
Factor 6 LBO Deal Values (3m Trailing) -0.00005
Adj. R-sq: 0.591 SE: 0.820 Adj. R-sq: 0.683 SE: 0.723
Run 4: Baseline and Modified Models: 28% Improvement
Baseline Model Modified Model
Factor I Constant 1.591 Constant -2.408
Factor 2 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.666 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.602
Factor 3 >3 Professionals 0.593 CS Lev Loan Total Return Index 0.287
Factor 4 SDNY Case P > 0.10 Real GDP (6m Lag) 0.00054
Factor 5 DE Case P > 0.10
Adj. R-sq: 0.620 SE: 0.798 Adj. R-sq: 0.687 SE: 0.724
Run 5: Baseline and Modified Models: -92% Improvement
Baseline Model Modified Model
Factor I Constant 1.945 Constant 3.983
Factor 2 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.683 Ln (Assets + Debts) 0.611
Factor 3 >3 Professionals P > 0.10 CS Lev Loan Total Return Index 0.242
Factor 4 SDNY Case P > 0.10 LBO Deal Values (3m Trailing) -0.00004
Factor 5 DE Case P > 0.10 FF Target Rate (6m Lag) -0.098
1 Adj. R-sq: 0.623 SE: 0.722 Adj. R-sq: 0.686 SE: 0.658
Supplemental 3: Non-case Predictors - Data Description and Correlation Matrix
Security/ Rate Description
CS Levered Loan Total Return Index CTRB Credit Suisse Index. Source: Bloomberg.
CRY Index (6-month lag) Reuters/ Jefferies CRB IX: Arithmetic average of futures prices for long-only,
diversified commodities fund with monthly rebalancing. Source: Bloomberg.
Crude Oil Light Sweet Crude Oil, NYMEX, generic one-month futures contract. Source:
Bloomberg.
Ln 5-year Swap Rate USD Swap Semi 30/360 5YR. Source: Bloomberg.
Mortgage Delinquencies (% total, 6-month lag) Delinquencies as a percentage of total residential loans outstanding. Source:
Mortgage Bankers Assoc/ Bloomberg.
5y BB/ BB- Rate (6-month lag) SP Corp US. Source: Bloomberg.
5y BB/ BB- Spread SP Corp US. Source: Bloomberg.
LBO Deal Volumes (3-month trailing) * Source: SDC Platinum.
DJIA Index Source: Bloomberg.
Fed Funds Target Rate (6-month lag) FDTR Index. Source: Bloomberg.
Macro Indicator Description
Real GDP (6-month lag) US Real GDP (chain-weighted). Source: Bloomberg.
Investment/ Inventories Gross Private Domestic Investment (fixed investments plus changes in
inventories by all firms in the US). Source: Bloomberg.
Ln ISM Index (6-month lag) Source: Bloomberg.
Corporate Profits (6-month lag) CPFTTOT Index. Source: Bloomberg.
Business Cycle/ Recession Indicator * Source: NBER.
* Interaction variable.
Ret (Given Spread Spread Aggr
EM(6m CSLevtLn (Given CRY(6m Crude CorpProf Del%(6m SyBBBB- LBO (Given (Given (Given RealGDP FFtarget
Lag) TotRet Recess) Iag) (spot) (6mLag) 5ySwnp Lag) (6mLag) volumes) Recess) LBO Recess) DJi1A (6mLag) Ihvhnvest (6mlag)
ISM (6m Lag) A"00
CS Lev 1n Tot Ret -0.047 1000
LevLnRet(GivenRecess) -0.394 0275 1000
CRY(6m Lag) 0220 0262 -0.134 1000
Crude (spot) -0.007 -0.048 -0.064 -0.004 1000
CorpProf(6mtag) -0031 -0069 0.007 -028 -0495 1000
SySwap 0378 -0.225 -0.034 -0223 -0.335 0.731 1000
Del%(6m Lag) 0.004 0.16 -0201 0.85 0.486 -0.777 -0.753 1000
SyBBBB-(6m Lag) -0.09 -0.087 0.99 0.039 0.590 -0.088 0.072 -019 1000
5yBB (Given LBOvolurmes) 0.68 -0.074 -0211 -0293 0292 -0.079 0268 0.028 0.16 1000
SyBBSpread(GivenRecess) -0.565 0.008 0602 -0.347 -0.0 -0.086 -0.065 -0237 0.147 -0302 1000
5yBB Spread(GivenLBO Vol) 0.462 -0.062 -0.71 -0.307 0.4T -0290 -0.049 0200 0.81 0926 -0251 1000
LBO3MAggr(GivenRecess) -0.506 -0.1)9 0284 -0.374 0.023 -0.1 -0060 -082 0.079 -0260 U21 -028 1000
DJIAL -0.19 0.18 0.064 -0.403 -0.08 0.673 0.751 -0549 0230 0.110 0.25 -0.89 0.122 1000
Rea1GDP (6m Lag) -0.435 0.V3 0.22 -0.049 0.784 -0.687 -0.7V 0.623 0.394 -0.009 0266 0241 0266 -0241 1000
Inv hIvest -0.041 0.035 0.01 -0.097 0.768 -0.099 0.09 0.18 0.634 0.336 -0.040 0339 -0.059 0.409 0.587 l000
FF target (6m bg) 0.366 -0.170 -0.034 0.036 -0.449 0.82 0870 -0.88 0.136 0.090 -0233 -0.86 -0270 0.541 -0.802 -0.1 1000
Supplemental 4: ABI Sample - Data Description
Sample Description
The ABI Fee Study was conducted by Stephen Lubben in 2007.28 Lubben examined a
total of 1,026 cases, each of which was filed in 2004. The data set included 945 randomly
selected cases and a sub-sample of 81 "big" cases.29 We focus on Lubben's random case sample,
(the "ABI Fee Sample") since: (1) we prefer to work with a random data set, rather than one that
was selected according to case size in a particular year; and since (2) Lubben indicates that his
"Big Case" data set is limited by a "study design [which] has the potential to slightly depress
reported fees in the largest cases in the sample."30
10 Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study, American Bankruptcy Institute (2007). Stephen Lubben
is the Daniel J. Moore professor of law at Seton Hall University School of Law.
29 Id. at 17. The "big" cases Lubben uses comprise a filtered list of 2004 cases, listed on August 2005, on the
"Major Bankruptcies" database (http://www.bankruptcydata.com/findabrtop.asp).
30 Id. at 15 through 19. As Lubben explains: "The data entry form allowed for the input of up to ten debtor
professionals...In just over [17%] of the cases in the big case dataset, and about half a percent of the random
sample, all eight "other professional" fields were used and in some sub-part of this group of cases, additional
professionals were retained but not entered into the database."
Lubben's random sample is also limited: by design, the sample is limited by a narrow filing date window; in
addition the sample is limited by missing data.
As Lubben explains, each case within the random data sample was "followed for two
years or until they ceased to be in Chapter 11." The 945 cases contained in the Random data set
were selected (randomly), via stratified sampling,3 1 from judicial districts across the United
States.
The table below summarizes the sample characteristics for Lubben's ABI Fee Sample,
after filtering for the presence of a "Plan Date."32  The table describes the "ABI Sample" data
used in the forecast analysis above.
Summary of Lubben's Random Data Set (Filtered for Plan Date)
Lead
Time in SDNY Attn Hr First Day Fee
Total F&E(y) DIP 3+ Profs USTcmte Ch I Case DECase Rate Motions A+D Examiner
Mean 407,037 0.238 0.248 0.356 1.168 0.010 0.050 344.208 0.356 45,279,306 0.010
Std. Dev. 1,131,625 0.428 0.434 0.481 0.532 0.100 0.218 164.079 0.481 214.610,060 0.100
Skewness 5 1.252 1.188 0.609 0.682 10.050 4.216 1.394 0.609 8 10.050
Kurtosis 31 2.557 2.398 1.337 3.072 104.000 19.097 4.772 1.337 77 104.000
Median 55,043 - - - 1.100 - - 300.000 - 2,656,360 -
Mean Abs. Dev. 538,796 0.362 0.373 0.459 0.432 0.020 0.094 124.608 0.459 70,074,440 0.020
Minimum 1,755 - - - 0.169 - - 100.000 - 115,298 -
Maximum 8,085,906 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.833 1.000 1.000 950.000 1.000 2,022,744,162 1.000
Range 8,084,151 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.664 1.000 1.000 850.000 1.000 2,022.628.864 1.000
Count 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
1st Quartile 18,719 - - - 0.769 - - 250.000 - 1,224,240 -
3rd Quartile 219,096 - - 1.000 1.483 - - 400.000 1.000 10,645,384 -
Interquartile Range 200,377 - - 1.000 0.714 - - 150.000 1.000 9.421,144 -
Residuals Examination
A "runs" test for the sample data yields a z-value of -1.27933 and a p-value of 0.201,
indicating a lack of convincing evidence in favor of order among the residuals.34  In other words,
we are not convinced of a lack of independence among the residuals.
31 Id. at 15 through 16. "The cases in the ABI Chapter 11 Fee Study were drawn from 33 districts around the United
States. Three districts from each of the eleven numbered judicial districts were selected: one from each of the high,
low and median population states in the circuit.. .Up to forty cases were selected from each district. Up to twenty
cases were selected from the first six months of the year, and up to twenty more were selected from the final half of
the year. Within each six-month period, cases were selected in the order they were filed."
32 The earlier of plan confirmation date and plan effective date.
Similarly, we discern no pattern when mapping residuals against Fit for the sample data
set. This is shown in the figure below.
Residuals vs Fit for ABI Data Sample
Residual vs Fit
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Supplemental 5: Filters Applied to Sample Data Sets
Dismissed or Converted Cases
Our analysis eliminates cases that are either dismissed or converted to Chapter 7.
Filter for "Plan Date"
We apply a filter for "Plan Date" (i.e. the earlier-recorded of plan confirmation date or
plan effective date). We do so because many of the cases sampled remain in bankruptcy for two
years or more.
3 Z-value in this case is the number of standard errors the observed number of runs is below (or above) the expected
number of runs. P-value follows the typical interpretation.
34 Observed versus expected runs were 45 to 51.38.
3 A narrowing of variance in Fit is conceivably but not persuasively evident.
It is our hypothesis that spreads and other market rates help to determine professional
costs by contributing to the complexity of a given refinancing. To the degree that this is true, the
more relevant point in time would not be the filing date but the Plan Date, since we suspect that
this date would more closely determine financing terms. 36
With respect to the data used by LoPucki and Doherty the filter for Plan Date does not
alter the data sample, since a plan confirmation date is available for each case in the sample.
With respect to the ABI Fee Sample this filter does have an impact and largely
determines the final set of 101 cases included in the sample.
36 We are aware that in many cases DIP financing is arranged prior to filing; however we suspect that in general
financing terms are adjusted prospectively.
